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Abstract 
Insider attacks become a severe threat to organizations. The emergence of Cloud computing that provides computing 
as a utility has attracted organizations to store their sensitive data remotely by subscribing the virtual storage from 
Cloud service provider. While data outsourcing relieves the data owners from burden of local data storage 
maintenance and security, the steps of embracing Cloud storage service has led to security problems. With the 
services provided by Cloud service provider that can be extended from Cloud user to Private Cloud and expanded to 
Public Cloud, there are many possibilities that malicious insider attacks may occur to exploit the weaknesses of 
Cloud systems. Until now there are no perfect mitigation strategies that can be relied on to solve the threats. We 
describe the Cloud computing and security issues, discuss about malicious insiders attack in Cloud computing and 
analyses the existing mitigation strategies and techniques to reduce malicious insiders threats in Cloud computing. 
© 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Universiti Malaysia 
Kelantan, Malaysia 
Keywords:  Cloud Computing;  Insider Attacks; Malicious Insider Collusions; Mitigation Strategies; Cloud Computing Security;
Data Security. 
1. Introduction 
Cloud Computing has gained significant acceptance because of the economic and technical benefits in 
delivering computing resources. Organizations and businesses can outsource their IT infrastructure into 
the Cloud and get benefits from rapid provisioning, scalability, and cost advantages. Organizations begin 
to adopt the advantages of flexibility, scalability, and management provided by Cloud computing 
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platforms and services, and often consider security as one of their top concerns in Cloud environments. 
Although the benefits of Cloud Computing are distinct, security is a major constrain and numerous 
security risks and challenges have been identified.  
A survey conducted by The Computer Security Institute (Richardson, 2008) indicated about 44% of 
all organisations experienced abuse of computer systems in 2008 which dropped to 30% in 2009; 42% 
reported loss of laptops both in 2008 as well as 2009; and 17% reported theft of customer data. The 2009 
survey (Peter, 2009) also revealed 25% of the respondents felt that 60% of the financial losses were 
caused by insiders;  unauthorised access or privileged access by insiders is 15%; and Internet access and 
e-mails abuse by insider are the fourth most rampant incident. Both the surveys indicate that insider 
threats are real and nearly rising to the level of an external threat.  
Security is one of the major anxieties when planning to adopt the cloud. Proving the security of data in 
cloud is important to achieve users’ trust on cloud providers. One of the most serious challenges, not only 
to cloud computing, but to data security in general, is the insider threat. The insider threat is one of the 
problems that concern organizations and individuals about cloud computing. Moving data to cloud raises 
the number of insiders, which may expose to insider attack. A malicious insider, such as a cloud 
administrator, can easily inspect the virtual machines of cloud users and retrieve sensitive information. 
Insider attacks are always identified as a high-impact risk as malicious insiders can affect the security of 
many users. Furthermore, this risk of insider attacks will be more serious and damaging when involving 
private cloud, public cloud and hybrid deployment of both. There will be communications and 
collaborations taking place between consumers, cloud provider, cloud users and so on that can encourage 
the collusion of malicious activities to exploit the vulnerabilities to compromise the organization asset.  
Cloud computing offers some incredible benefits such as unlimited storage, access to quick processing 
power and the ability to easily share and process information. However, it does have several issues, and 
most of them are security related. Cloud systems must overcome many obstacles before it becomes 
widely accepted and adopted, but it can be utilized right now in the right conditions with some 
compromises. People can enjoy the full benefits of cloud computing if researcher can address the very 
real security concerns that appear with storing of sensitive information in databases scattered around the 
Internet.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.0 discusses the Cloud computing and security 
issues, Section 3.0  explains about the malicious insiders attack in Cloud computing, Section 4.0 
discusses the analysis of existing mitigation strategies and techniques to reduce malicious insiders in the 
cloud computing, Section 5.0 conclude the discussion 
2. Cloud Computing and Security Issues 
A Cloud is a type of parallel and distributed system consisting of a collection of inter-connected and 
virtualized computers that are dynamically provisioned and presented as one or more unified computing 
resources based on service-level agreements established through negotiation between the service provider 
and consumers (Buyya, et al., 2009). Cloud computing becomes a new paradigm for hosting and 
delivering services over the Internet. The benefits of Cloud computing are it enables ubiquitous, 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources such as 
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services that can be rapidly provisioned and released with 
minimal management effort or service provider interaction. Cloud computing combines many computing 
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concepts and technologies such as Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), Web 2.0, virtualization and 
other technologies with reliance on the Internet. 
 
Cloud systems are very economical and useful for businesses of all sizes Onwubiko (2010). Cloud 
computing is a technology that everyone would love to take full advantage of because it offers: 
 
1. Limitless Flexibility: With access to millions of different databases, and the ability to combine 
them into customized services. 
2. Better Reliability and Security: Users no longer need to worry about their hardware failure, or 
hardware being stolen. 
3. Enhanced Collaboration: By enabling online sharing of information and applications, the Cloud 
offers users new ways of working together and cooperate. 
4. Portability: Users can access their data from anywhere. 
5. Simpler devices: With data stored and processed in the Cloud, users simply need an interface to 
access and use this data, play games, etc. 
6. Unlimited Storage: Cloud offers a large expandable storage that can be upgraded when needed. 
7. Access to quick processing power: Latest technology and infrastructure make the delivery of 
services faster. 
 
There are three famous service models of Cloud computing as described below: 
 
a) Software as a Service (SaaS) 
The capability provided to the consumer is to use the provider’s application running on a Cloud 
infrastructure. In this model, software application is hosted as service and end users use the 
application on the web browser. 
b) Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
The capability provided to the consumer is to deploy onto the Cloud infrastructure his own 
applications without installing any platform or tools on their local machines. In this model, end-user 
creates, tests and upload application using tools and libraries hosted by the service provider. 
c) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
The capability provided to the consumer is to provision processing, storage, networks, and other 
fundamental computing resources where the consumer is able to deploy and run arbitrary software, which 
can include operating systems and applications. This model involves hosting of hardware computing 
services like storage, hard drive, servers, and network components. Service provider is responsible for 
maintenance and managing all these resources. 
 
The advent of Cloud computing technologies has created an environment in which all sorts of data can 
be easily accessed by almost anyone if it is not properly protected. But at the same time most companies 
and businesses are storing important and sensitive data like client names and contacts, transaction records 
in Cloud. This has led to the development of various data protection software, services and technology in 
Cloud so that the data stored in private, public and hybrid Cloud remains secure and safe. Both service 
providers and their clients lack of a consistent of knowledge and guidelines of collaborative insider 
attacks in the Cloud and this is seen as a major concern when customers plan to move to Cloud computing 
technology and services.  
 
Although there are many benefits to adopting Cloud computing, there are also some limitations 
associated with it, which need to be observed. Security is the biggest issues in Cloud computing as it 
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offering storage service on a remote location that the consumers are generally need to trust the Cloud 
provider and unaware of what happens to their data. External data storage, dependency on the public 
Internet, lack of control, multi-tenancy and integration with internal security make Cloud computing 
exposes to risks. 
 
As individuals and enterprises produce more and more data that must be stored and utilized (emails, 
personal health records, photo albums, fax documents, financial transactions, and so on), they are 
motivated to outsource their local complex data management systems to the cloud owing to its greater 
flexibility and cost-efficiency. However, once users no longer physically possess their data, its 
confidentiality and integrity can be at risk. Traditionally, to control the distribution of privacy-sensitive 
data, users establish a trusted server to store data locally in clear, and then control that server to check 
whether requesting users present proper certification before letting them access the data. From a security 
standpoint, this access control architecture is no longer applicable when we outsource data to the cloud. 
Because data users and cloud servers are not in the same trusted domain, the server might no longer be 
fully trusted as an omniscient reference monitor for defining and enforcing access control policies and 
managing user details. In the event of either server compromise or potential insider attacks, users’ private 
data might even be exposed (Kui, et al., 2012). 
 
The main security concerns of clients are loss of direct control of their data and being forced to trust a 
third party provider with confidential information. Among security threats in the cloud, insider threats 
such as malicious system administrators pose a serious risk to clients (Sundararajan, et al., 2011). The 
problem is challenging because the cloud provider’s system administrators have elevated privileges for 
performing genuine system maintenance and administration tasks. An attack often posited by this insider 
is theft of sensitive information, resulting in loss of data confidentiality and/or integrity. The insider 
described by this threat may be motivated financially, a common motivator for theft of intellectual 
property or fraud. But another attack possibility that must be considered is IT sabotage, where employees 
seek to harm an employer’s IT infrastructure. Some may dismiss this type of crime in cloud 
environments, where administrators work for the provider, not the customer organizations. However, this 
should not be entirely discounted. Even if it is unlikely an insider has a grudge against the victim 
organization, an insider’s a grudge against the cloud provider could result in harm to a victim 
organization with the intention of damaging the cloud provider’s reputation (Claycomb & Nicoll, 2012).  
 
An attacker that has access to the cloud storage component is able to take snapshots or alter data in the 
storage. This might be done once, multiple times, or continuously. An attacker that also has access to the 
processing logic of the cloud can also modify the functions and their input and output data. Even though 
in the majority of cases it may be legitimate to assume a cloud provider to be honest and handling the 
customers’ affairs in a respectful and responsible manner, there still remains a risk of malicious 
employees of the cloud provider, successful attacks and compromisation by third parties, or of actions 
ordered by a subpoena (Bohli, et al., 2013). 
There are two types of adversaries. The first type is the insider adversaries who can be employees that 
work for the cloud service provider or people who have gained access to infrastructure’s internal network 
by social engineering or other means. They have control over the all servers, thus capable of changing any 
user’s image or the legacy host on the hosting servers. The goal of the insider adversaries is to steal 
documents and applications from the user’s VM. Furthermore, these adversaries would not expose their 
insider access with a simple deny of service attack (DoS). The second type is the outsider adversaries who 
reside outside the cloud infrastructure. In particular, we consider them the malicious users who have 
control over the VMs residing on the same physical server. This type of adversary is capable to using 
various VM Exit to exploit the software bugs in the hypervisor. As a result, both types of adversaries are 
585 Zulkefl i Mohd Yusop and Jemal Abawajy /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  129 ( 2014 )  581 – 591 
capable of gaining control of the host system and thus compromising the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of legitimate user’s VM. The goal of outsider adversaries is similar to the insider in that they 
want to compromise the confidentiality and integrity of the target user’s VM. However, since it is 
relatively easy to gain access a guest VM, they are not concerned of being exposed and might launch DoS 
attack on neighbouring VMs (Ning, et al., 2012).  
3.  Malicious Insider Attacks 
According to S.E. Institutes (2013) defines an insider threat as such “A malicious insider threat to an 
organization is a current or former employee, contractor, or other business partner who has or had 
authorized access to an organization's network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused that 
access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the 
organization's information or information systems.” 
Bishop and Gates (2008) defined an insider based on violation of a security policy using legitimate 
access and violation of an access control policy by obtaining unauthorized access. In the first case, the 
insiders perform some actions that is opposing to the security policy using their legitimate access. When 
the insiders have legitimate access to the data or resources and use that eligibility to provide the 
information to someone who does not have access or to deny access to someone who does have access. In 
the second case, the insiders misuse their eligibility to extend their privileges that enable them to break 
both the access control and security policies. They are considered key and trusted assets and are eligible 
the highest possible privileges for the systems they own. Excessive and unnecessary privileges can lead 
system owners to act in the way they please with very little restrictions and accountability (Sibai & 
Menasce, 2012). 
When insiders becoming malicious the organization should anticipate the risk of insider attacks to 
their data, their business partners and their long-term future. These attacks are arranged or executed by 
people that are trusted with varying levels of access to a company’s systems and facilities, and who have 
intimate knowledge of the company’s infrastructure, which an external attacker would take a significant 
period of time to develop.  
An insider is an individual who is a present or former member of an organization, employee, 
contractor, partner, vendor or integrator, consultant and auditor, who is trusted, who formerly or currently 
has knowledge, credentials and granted with legitimate access and privileges to organization information 
systems and services in order to execute organization and business tasks. A malicious insider is an 
individual who is adversely, deliberately, intentionally and inevitably misuse his/her trusted position in an 
organization to abuse, exploit and violate the information systems and services to compromise 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of organizations’ assets.   
The malicious insiders can cause serious threats to an organization. They are well- trained and well-
versed with the infrastructure, tools and equipment to operate their tasks. They are aware of missions, 
visions, standard operating procedures, rules and regulations, terms and conditions as well as policies of 
the organization. However, they can suddenly turn to be an adversary when they are not satisfied with the 
organization decision-making, their claims are not fulfilled, they are not fairly rewarded, and they are not 
well treated by the organization. They are more dangerous compared to external hacker because they 
could perform malicious action in a very structured way, smooth, faster, indistinctly that might severely 
impact the organization.  
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Insider attacks can be performed by malicious employees at the provider’s or user’s site. Malicious 
insider can steal the confidential data of cloud users. This threat can break the trust of cloud users on 
provider. A malicious insider can easily obtain passwords, cryptographic keys and files. These attacks 
may involve various types of fraud, damage or theft of information and misuse of IT resources. The threat 
of malicious attacks has increased due to lack of transparency in cloud provider’s processes and 
procedures. It means that a provider may not reveal how employees are granted access and how this 
access is monitored or how reports as well as policy compliances are analyzed. Additionally, users have 
little visibility about the hiring practices of their provider that could open the door for an adversary, 
hackers or other cloud intruders to steal confidential information or to take control over the cloud. The 
level of access granted could enable attackers to collect confidential data or to gain complete control over 
the cloud services with little or no risk of detection. Malicious insider attacks can damage the financial 
value as well as brand reputation of an organization. Moving critical applications and sensitive data to a 
public and shared cloud environment is a major concern for organization. That is because organization 
has lost control of the data and totally depends on Cloud provider data security and defence. To alleviate 
these concerns, a cloud solution provider must ensure that customers can continue to have the same 
security and privacy controls over their applications and services by providing evidence to these 
customers that their organization and customers are secure (Che Fauzi, et al., 2012).  
Cloud providers facilitate the users with various types of services including unlimited bandwidth and 
storage capacity. Some cloud service providers offer free limited trial periods that gives an opportunity 
for hackers to access the cloud immorally, their impact includes decoding and cracking of passwords, 
launching potential attack points and executing malicious commands. Spammers, malicious code authors 
and other cybercriminals can conduct their activities with relative impunity, as cloud service providers are 
targeted for their weak registration systems and limited fraud detection capabilities. For example some 
cybercriminals use rich content applications such as flash files that enable them to hide their malicious 
code and utilize users’ browsers to install malware.  
As Cloud computing uses virtualization, cloud providers are dwelling the user’s applications on 
virtual machines (VMs) within a shared infrastructure. The VMs are virtualized based on the physical 
hardware of cloud provider. In order to maintain the security of users, providers are isolating the VMs 
from each other so if any of them is malicious so that it will not affect the other VMs under the same 
provider. The VMs are managed by hypervisor in order to provide virtual memory as well as CPU 
scheduling policies to VMs. As the hypervisor is main source of managing a virtualized cloud platform, 
hackers are targeting it to access the VMs and the physical hardware, because hypervisor resides between 
VMs and hardware, so attack on hypervisor can damage the VMs and hardware. Strong isolation should 
be employed to ensure that VMs are not able to impact or access the operations of other users running 
under the same cloud service provider. Several vendors such as Xen and KVM are providing strong 
security mechanisms of securing the cloud hypervisors, but still it is identified that sometimes security of 
VMs is compromised. 
4.  Analysis of Mitigation Strategies 
For the purpose of understanding the factors influencing online banking services towards customer 
service delivery, this paper proposes a conceptual model (see figure 1 below). This conceptual model is 
developed based on several previous studies related to electronic banking, behavioral factors, banking 
application, and customer service delivery. 
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5. Methodology 
 
The idea of attack tree came from (Schneier, 1999) as early as 1999. Attack trees can be used for 
making security decisions. Based on varying attacks Attack Tree offers a formal, methodical way of 
describing the security of a system. The attacks against a system are represented in a tree structure, with 
the goal as the root node and different ways of achieving the goal as leaf nodes. Attack tree is as a formal 
methodology for analyzing the security of systems and subsystems. Attack Tree can assist organizations 
establish attack circumstances by analyzing system vulnerabilities and dependencies among these 
vulnerabilities. To detect insider attacks, several studies were based on the attack tree or attack graph. 
Chinchani, et al., (2005) proposed a model based on the attack tree and attack graph. Hui, et al., (2006) 
proposed the prediction model of Insider Threat Based on Multi-agents that consist of central agent, 
interactive agent, predicting agent, response agent and communication services agent. Their model is 
based on the agent and the distribute intrusion detection system (DIDS) with several advantages such as 
scalability. In the model, before the user can login into a system, a user must have a session with 
interactive agent. The interactive agents will generate the intended operations and submits them to central 
agents. The central agents will create the customized minimal attack tree and the information of tree 
structure will be stored in local rule database. Each user will be assigned the unique corresponding 
minimal attack tree. The rule database can be generated in run-time that is obviously different from 
traditional static rule database. Predicting agents will monitor users’ operations and the probability of 
attacks based on the minimal attack tree. If an attack is detected, response agents will report the 
information to central agents. However, this requires that attack trees contain knowledge about the 
attacks. 
 
Yaseen and Panda (2011) investigated the problem of the flow of information in a database that cause 
insider threat. The flow of information depends on dependencies between different data items at tables, 
records and attribute level of a relational database. There are six types of dependency relationships among 
data items as defined by the authors. Insiders may use their knowledge about dependencies to get 
unauthorized information. Insiders may infer unauthorized information by exploiting these dependencies 
between data items. A dependency relationship may involve a constraint. The authors classify such 
constraints into two types such as changing the value of an attribute and deleting or inserting records. The 
constraints show the values of data items that are stored in the knowledgebase of insiders. A change on 
the dependent data occurs only when the specified constraint is satisfied. Insider may be able to predict 
values of data items, which they may not be authorized to access by investigating constraints. Yaseen and 
Panda (2010) proposed Constraint and Dependency Graph (CDG), Dependency Matrix and Threat 
Prediction Graph to mitigate the problem. CDG is used to build knowledge graphs of insiders. The 
knowledge graph is build based on the Petri Nets a mathematical and graphical modelling tool using 
formula. The knowledge graph is created to represent the dependencies and constraints.  The authors used 
CDG to show how insiders can follow dependencies to infer knowledge about data items. Changing the 
value of an attribute and deleting or inserting records produce constraints. Insertion or deletion in a table 
may affect other records in the same table. Therefore, a dependency matrix is used to show dependencies 
between different tables as well as the constraints on such dependencies.  The dependency matrix 
constructs clusters of tables such as safe cluster and hot cluster. The safe cluster is a cluster of tables in 
which each table is independent, directly and transitively, from all other tables that belong to the same 
cluster. The hot cluster is a cluster of tables in which each table is directly dependent on all other tables 
that belongs to the same cluster. To predict the threat the authors construct the threat prediction graph 
(TPG) that consists of an attribute, the amount of information the insider has about and the threshold 
value. The threshold value is the amount of information that the insider is allowed to get about. To predict 
the threat three types of graphs has to be generated. In cloud computing scenario which involves VM that 
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has a huge processing of cloud user access, it might not be economical to have these processes in a real 
time. It might need a high speed of processing in the databases to capture all the transactions otherwise 
delays will occur and the transactions will be slow. Therefore, this approach is not adaptable in Cloud 
environment. 
 
Yaseen and Panda (2011) investigated the problem of an insider’s Knowledgebase in a database 
system. The Knowledgebase contains the values of data items accessed by an insider. These values may 
be combined with insensitive data items to infer sensitive information. Denying access to the data items 
would not solve the problem because the values are still exist in the insider’s Knowledgebase. Values of 
data items in Knowledgebase have a lifetime. If other insiders update the values of the data items, the 
values will be different from the existing values in the insider’s Knowledgebase that cause the lifetime of 
the data items expire. However, updating values of data items does not make their lifetime expire. 
Furthermore an insider’s task may consist of several operations that involve many data items. Connection 
between data items may involve dependency relationship so that the access to data items needs to be 
performed in some order. Different order of access to data items will lead to different type of risks and 
vulnerability.  
 
Yaseen and Panda (2011) proposed two methods for executing an insider’s task: batch of transaction 
and transaction by transaction. Batch of transaction involves set of operations required for each task, 
various insiders and their tasks, and dependencies of data items between the operations. In this method, 
the authors determined which accesses the insider should get first depend on the level of risks. Unordered 
accesses to data item to complete a transaction will expose to vulnerability in the system. The access is 
based on dependency relationship between the data items. Different dependency has different impact on 
access to data items. Furthermore to minimize the risk the authors applied the lifetime to the data items. 
When other insiders update the values of data items the lifetime of the data items in Knowledgebase will 
expire. When the lifetime expired, insiders cannot infer the correct information based on from previous 
access. However if there is no other insider update the data item values the transaction will be delayed. 
Therefore, the insider will be granted an incorrect value of the risky data item. The incorrect but close 
enough value is provided to the insiders but still do not expose any sensitive data. This is done by using 
Neural Dependency and Inference Graph (NDIG).  
 
In the latter way, insiders may submit the transactions one after another. The first approach could not 
be applied when the system does not know what insider plan to access. To solve the problem, accesses 
patterns of data items for each task of each insider can be extracted and stored. These patterns are used to 
construct the Task Graph that indicates the data items, the paths of possible accesses to those data items. 
It also shows the dependent and independent operations by insider in a task. This can predict the tasks of 
insiders and combine it with their knowledgebase can facilitate the prediction. Based on this model it is 
possible to enhance it to solve the problem of collaborative insider’s threat in Cloud computing. This is 
because the model can detect multiple insiders operation by looking at the access to the data item. But the 
constraint is Cloud computing is a large system that generates a lot of data in real time. It is impossible to 
apply this solution in a multiple huge Cloud database that contains many data items. Thus, this model 
need to be improved and enhance to cater the insider’s threat in the Cloud.  
 
Chen, et al. (2006) addressed the problem of collusion attacks to electronic transactions in e-
commerce system through the security protocol. The electronic transactions are exposed to internal 
threats and the transactions may be possibly intercepted and revealed by internal computer or network 
users. Security protocols are implemented to secure the transactions. However, the security protocols 
contain some flaws and collusion attacks may occur when there are extensions of message sharing among 
people in the organization.  The collusion attacks usually involve of an attacker, a group of participants 
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and a threshold of the attack. The collusion attacks begin when the principals put their individual secrets 
together and jointly recover the secret. A malicious user who attempts to obtain unauthorised data by 
colluding with other principals might discover more secrets even though none of them previously knew 
this message individually. Chen, et al.  (2006)  proposed a framework to detect collusion attacks in 
security protocols. The framework consists of three steps: identify frequent k-item sets from the 
transaction database of principals; construct knowledge based inference rules, and; detect collusion 
attacks by matching frequent item sets with the knowledge base. Frequent Patterns (FP) tree algorithm is 
used to identify the frequent item sets from database transactions. A knowledge base is constructed that 
comprises the knowledge that is specific to the domain of application, including such things as facts in the 
domain, and rules that describe the relations or phenomena in the domain. The inference rules of 
knowledge base consist of the basic manipulation of secure messages in security protocols. The detection 
of collusion attacks is implemented by matching derived frequent item sets with knowledge bases. The 
intrinsic inference mechanisms of Prolog are used to manipulate the knowledge base and frequent item 
sets. This approach cannot be applied into the Cloud environment where there are many huge databases 
scattered, distributed and located at different sites of network. As Prolog rules are used for the knowledge 
representation, and the Prolog inference engine is used to derive conclusions, therefore the DBMS must 
periodically synchronize the scattered databases to make sure that they all have consistent data in order to 
identify frequent itemsets, construct knowledge and detect collusion. 
 
Kohli, et al. (2011) addressed the problem of insider collusion threats to critical assets. Collusion 
threats occur when two or more employees accessing a system with different privileges collude. Insiders 
may collude with other insiders or with outsiders to attack, steal or damage the organization’s assets. The 
collusion is done in a structured manner and has a defined objective. Unauthorized elevation of privileges 
may occur when one or more threat agents are insiders. The collusion threat might be even worse if it 
happens in Value webs where organizations collaborate with other organizations through cross-
organizational networks that involved outsourcing, partnering, joint ventures and subcontracting. The 
collusion may involve other kind of threat agent called External Insider. It is very difficult to predict the 
attack vectors, motivation factors and the actors involved in the collusion. Collusion threats give more 
negative impact to organizations compare to individual threats. Kohli, et al. (2011) proposed an approach 
to identify the collusion threat. The approach is based on risk analysis that gives a realistic impression of 
the asset’s security risks and assists in highlighting risks. The assessment of risk occurs after the 
identification of threats and vulnerabilities surrounding those assets. The authors highlight the problem of 
collusion in banking system transaction and classified the approach in two ways. The first scenario is 
where the collusion threats are not considered during threat identification. To complete a transaction each 
agent has physical or logical access to an asset. The access to critical asset is controlled by segregating a 
different limit of access for each of threat agent to accomplish a transaction.  For each individual threat 
agent the risk of accessing the asset is low due to the segregation of duties for each level. The second 
scenario is where the risk is assessed after the consideration of colluding threat agents. By analysing the 
number of individuals having access to the asset, the number of collusion possible could be predicted. 
The higher the collusion possible number the severe risk could be expected. This approach can be adapted 
to banking system as the bank has a structured role-based access control system to determine the access 
rights that a user possesses within an application domain. In this system a role is defined by function and 
position, separation of duties within the organization from human resource database so that the access can 
be controlled internally. However cloud computing utilizes the virtual computing technology, data may be 
scattered in various virtual data centre rather than stay in the same physical location or even across the 
national borders. Therefore the approach is not adaptable in Cloud environment. 
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5. Conclusion 
Malicious insiders’ attacks that exist in the Cloud system attempting to exploit the weaknesses of the 
system pose a serious threat to organizations. With the flexibility of Cloud system the malicious insiders 
can manipulate the privileges to access the sensitive information remotely. Even worse, malicious activity 
from the inside Cloud provider system is hard to observe and could pose severe implications to data 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. However no approach has so far offered a satisfactory path 
towards a solution. Therefore this study will investigate the suitable mitigation strategies to overcome the 
problem. 
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